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Abstract 
Transnational workers on large-scale construction projects are often poorly included in national industrial 
relations systems, which results in employment relations becoming trapped in vicious circles of weak 
enforcement and precarious work. This article shows how Danish unions have, nonetheless, been 
successful in enacting existing institutions and organising the construction of the Copenhagen Metro City 
Ring, despite initially encountering a highly fragmented, transnational workforce and several 
subcontracting firms that actively sought to circumvent Danish labour-market regulation. This is explained 
by the union changing their organising and enforcement strategies, thereby utilising various power 
resources to create inclusive strategies towards transnational workers. This includes efforts to create 
shared objectives and identity across divergent groups of workers and actively seeking changes in the 
public owners’ attitude towards employment relations.  
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Introduction 
Employer-driven labour migration creates some of the most precarious work within the European Union 
because employers use unorganised and highly mobile migrant workers as a source of cheap labour. 
Consequently, the economic freedoms that were supposed to promote prosperity across the EU are 
increasingly associated with precariousness and social dumping. As cross-border labour mobility increases, 
nationally rooted unions struggle to find new strategies to organise transnationally mobile workers and 
regulate their employment conditions (Meardi, 2012). Two big questions arising are why employer-driven 
labour migration creates precariousness within otherwise well-regulated labour markets and what unions 
can do about it. 
Previous research has answered the first question by pointing towards the importance of 
institutional enactment. While most receiving countries have formally inclusive institutions governing the 
employment conditions of transnational workers, these institutions are often circumvented or re-
interpreted by employers (Berntsen and Lillie, 2016). Additionally, it is hard to establish solidarity among 
domestic and transnational workers due to the short-term nature of the transnational workers’ stay, 
language barriers, cultural differences, economic disincentives (Caro et al., 2015), and lack of common 
identity and objectives (Kall et al., 2018; Refslund and Sippola, forthcoming). Instead, the transnational 
workers are often heavily dependent on their employer and, therefore, often support the effort to 
circumvent institutions (Berntsen, 2016; Lillie, 2016). Without the support of the transnational workers, 
unions have a very limited ability to maintain the usual functioning of domestic labour-market institutions. 
Thus, the combination of employer approaches, the lack of common identity across groups of workers, and 
inadequate union strategies seem to explain the lack of enactment of the formal inclusiveness of 
institutions in practice.  
However, little research has singled out what unions can do to counteract these problems. In fact, 
previous studies of union efforts to organise the transnational workers and re-regulate their employment 
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conditions present a rather bleak picture (Lillie and Sippola, 2011). Even if unions do sometimes succeed in 
preventing employers´ circumventions, the victories are often short-lived (Berntsen and Lillie, 2016). So, 
the question remains how unions can transform the Sisyphean task of constant and difficult enforcement 
into a more self-sustaining situation in which workers and employers contribute to an inclusive enactment 
of institutions and the prevention of precariousness in a ‘virtuous’ circle (Doellgast et al., 2018).  
This article presents a case study of how Danish unions succeeded in creating a more self-sustaining 
enforcement situation around transnational workers on the construction of the Copenhagen Metro City 
Ring (CMCR). Starting as a disorganised and union-hostile construction project, the CMCR experienced a 
dramatic shift to become a relatively well-organised construction project with a 30 per cent union density, 
shop stewards on every worksite, improved enforcement of collective agreements, and more cooperative 
employers. The article identify how trade unions initiated this shift and, more specifically, how they 
mobilised different power resources by developing new strategies. Analysing the processes, the article 
argues that a combination of 1) continuous organising efforts, 2) politicisation of the public owners 
responsibility for employment relations, and 3) more selective enforcement were all instrumental for 
causing the shift towards a more inclusive enactment of institutions. While traditional union organising and 
enforcement strategies are challenged when transnational workers are involved (Kall et al., 2018; Heery, 
2009), the case study shows that unions´ efforts to organise transnational workers can succeed when it is 
part of a broader strategic effort to improve the transnational workers’ employment relations. The analysis 
further highlights how unions need internal debates and learning processes to find effective ways of 
mobilising resources when facing new challenges and securing a better alignment between organising 
strategies and the needs of contingent workers such as transnational migrants (Simms and Holgate, 2010).  
 
Enactment, power, and strategies in a transnationalised construction sector 
Previous research shows that changes in employment relations are often caused by changes in the 
enactment rather than by formal institutional change (Jaehrling and Méhaut, 2013; Baccaro and Howell, 
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2017). However, while much focus has been on how institutional enactment deteriorates to become less 
inclusive and promote precariousness, few studies have looked at how actors can rebuild and sustain an 
inclusive institutional enactment for groups like transnational workers (Doellgast et al., 2018). This is an 
important issue for understanding what unions should do to face contemporary challenges.  In the 
following section, a theoretical framework for understanding this issue is outlined. 
First, Doellgast et al. (2018) argue that the degree to which the enactment of specific institutions 
prevents or promotes precarious work is dependent upon the interaction between 1) the formal 
inclusiveness of institutions, 2) employers’ orientation, 3) worker solidarity, and 4) union strategies. More 
importantly, they argue that the interaction between these four factors can become a self-reinforcing 
feedback loop that produces either a ‘vicious’ or a ‘virtuous’ circle. In the ‘vicious’ circles, fragmentation of 
institutions, exit-oriented employer strategies, lacking worker solidarity, and exclusive union strategies 
focusing on an often-shrinking core constituency will reinforce each other and promote precarious work. By 
contrast, inclusive institutions, partnership-oriented employers, worker solidarity, and union strategies 
aiming for the inclusion of divergent groups of workers will augment each other and prevent precarious 
work in a ‘virtuous’ circle. In either case, the feedback loop promotes the reproduction of a certain 
institutional enactment. Scholars should therefore focus on the interaction between different factors to 
understand how institutional enactments are reproduced. Nonetheless, stressing the interaction between 
factors does not tell us what unions can do to promote a shift from a vicious to a virtuous circle. 
Second, unions are resourceful actors that can utilise their power resources to contribute to inclusive 
strategies towards contingent workers. When trying to promote a virtuous enactment of institutions, most 
Western European unions can still draw on the institutional power (Webster, 2015) granted to them by 
formally inclusive institutions such as collective bargaining, chain liability, extension mechanisms, and 
labour clauses in public procurement (Berntsen and Lillie, 2016; Bosch and Weinkopf, 2013; Jaehrling et al., 
2018). Additionally, they can mobilise various forms of structural power, gained by workers´ position in the 
economy and their capacity to disrupt production processes, and associational power, originating from 
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workers’ collective organisation and representation (in the labour market, inside companies, and in the 
political sphere) (Wright, 2000; Silver, 2003). Additionally, unions may also use symbolic power, understood 
as leverage gained through symbolic action such as mass protests or morally laden discourses (Chun, 2009). 
Third, however, having such resources is not the same as using them successfully (Lévesque and 
Murray, 2010). Especially when resources need to be mobilised towards new challenges, unions need to 
make strategic choices and develop new strategies (Heery, 2009: Kall et al., 2018; Eldring et al., 2012). For 
instance, unions must learn to supplement formally inclusive union policies (as those described by Heery 
and Abbott, 2000) with inclusive practices that address workers´ real needs when dealing with new groups 
of contingent workers. They must also develop industrial action strategies that are based on and 
contributes to the formation of common identities and objectives across different groups of workers (Greer 
and Hauptmeier, 2012; Hyman, 1999; Kall et al., 2018).  
To study how unions mobilise their power and develop strategies for promoting virtuous change, this 
article focuses on one of the most precarious groups of workers in contemporary Europe, namely migrant 
workers. More specifically, it focuses on so-called transnational workers understood as labour migrants 
who are employed or recruited in one country to work temporarily in another. Some are posted workers 
while others are recruited by intermediaries to work for foreign subsidiaries in another country. Either way, 
the distinctive feature of transnational workers is that both they and their employer are ‘foreign’ to the 
national institutional context they work in, which increases the likelihood that they will enact institutions 
differently (Lillie and Greer, 2007; Wagner and Lillie, 2014). Given that the use of transnational workers is 
often associated with a business strategy that relies on cheap and flexible labour, employers will typically 
opt for an exit-oriented strategy involving various forms of regulatory evasion (Berntsen and Lillie, 2016). 
Due to the short-term nature of their stay, their ‘dual frame of reference' (Waldinger and Lichter, 2003), 
and their heavy dependence on their employer (Caro et al., 2015), these workers typically accept wages 
and working conditions that are substandard compared to the country of work.  
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Arguably, construction is the sector in which the presence of transnational workers has had the 
strongest impact on institutional enactment. While the construction sector has traditionally been relatively 
well-regulated in most Western European countries, staffing agencies and long, complex subcontracting 
chains have promoted the use of transnational workers (Caro et al., 2015; Wagner and Lillie, 2014). Despite 
the enduring presence of inclusive institutions, the enactment of these institutions is often eroded because 
they are underpinned by neither employer strategies nor worker solidarity. This may be why previous 
research shows that even strong unions have been unsuccessful in stopping the vicious enactment of 
employment relations institutions on large transnational construction sites. In a hallmark case study, Lillie 
and Sippola (2011) find that the otherwise powerful Finnish construction unions were unable to organise 
the construction of a nuclear power plant due to the ineffectiveness of their traditional enforcement tactics 
and their inability to organise and represent the transnational workforce. Similar findings emerge in more 
recent studies of the construction of the European Central Bank in Frankfurt (Wagner and Lillie, 2014) and 
the Eemshaven construction sites in the Netherlands (Berntsen and Lillie, 2016). While the Eemshaven 
study showed some progress in union efforts to safeguard the working standards of transnational workers, 
the authors point out that this progress concerned only a limited group of workers for a limited period. In 
other words, unions never succeeded in establishing the self-reinforcing ‘virtuous’ circles described by 
Doellgast et al. (2018). Therefore, despite investing substantial resources into the organisation of 
transnational workers and their employment conditions, it seems that unions still have not found the right 
strategies for solving the challenges identified by the literature. This article contributes to this literature by 
presenting a case study, which shows how a Danish construction union facilitated this shift on the 
Copenhagen Metro City Ring project. In line with the outlined theoretical framework, the analysis 
emphasises the process of transformation in which the union learned to use its power to create a more 
self-reinforcing ‘virtuous’ circle.  
 
The Copenhagen Metro City Ring project and its Danish context 
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The Copenhagen Metro City Ring (CMCR) is a 2.9-billion-euro construction project begun in 2009 and 
scheduled to finish in 2019. The Metro Company - the developer and owner of CMCR - is co-owned by 
Copenhagen municipality, Frederiksberg municipality and the Danish state. The main contractor on the 
CMCR is the Copenhagen Metro Team (CMT), a consortium of Italian construction companies. CMT mainly 
designs, plans, and controls the production, while it hires various subcontractors for the actual construction 
tasks. More than 250 subcontractors from 24 countries have been involved in the project. Italians, Poles, 
Rumanians and Portuguese make up the majority of the workers. Since the project consists of underground 
tunnelling and the construction of 17 metro stations, workers are scattered over multiple locations. 
Organising this highly fragmented and transnationalised construction project has proven to be a great 
challenge for the local construction workers union (called BJMF). To fully understand these challenges, 
some information about the Danish labour market is needed.  
In Denmark, collective agreements essentially regulates wages and working conditions (Andersen et 
al., 2014). There is no statutory minimum wage or legal extension of collective agreements, entailing that a 
company without a collective agreement can remunerate at any level employees are willing to accept. 
Nonetheless, the labour market remains highly regulated due to a well-organised workforce, strong unions, 
and multi-employer bargaining. Union density is around 67 per cent, and collective bargaining coverage is 
around 84 per cent, with the figures being 65 and 75 per cent respectively for the construction sector 
(Arnholtz and Andersen, 2016). Additionally, unions have far-reaching prerogatives to achieve collective 
agreements with companies, including secondary industrial action (Eldring et al., 2012), and they can 
impose and enforce collective agreements without having a single member in a given company. At the 
same time, however, a collective agreement binds unions to industrial peace, implying that they convert 
their structural power into institutional power. 
However, the increasing influx of transnational workers has challenged this situation. These mobile 
workers typically have lower wage expectations, seldom use the labour market to improve their conditions, 
and are typically not unionised. Most transnational workers are employed at standards below those set by 
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the collective agreements because unions have a hard time imposing and enforcing collective agreements 
on companies that mainly employ such transnational workers (Arnholtz and Andersen, 2016). Not only do 
these companies lack experience with unions, thereby making them more reluctant to sign collective 
agreements, but the temporary nature of their stay in Denmark also makes union pressure less effective. 
Therefore, to prevent precarious work, Danish construction unions have lobbied public authorities to put 
so-called labour clauses into their procurement tenders. These clauses require all contractors to follow the 
terms set by collective agreements. Increasingly, public construction work in Denmark is subject to such 
labour clauses (Jaehrling et al., 2018). This is also the case for the CMCR. The clauses provide the unions 
with a stronger starting point since they do not have to spend time and resources converting their 
structural power into institutional power by securing a collective agreement in the first place. Instead, they 
can focus on enforcing collective agreements and organising workers.  
While such formal inclusive institutions have helped, their enactment still matters. Enforcing and 
organising the CMCR was an enormous challenge for BJMF, which is a small local section of the United 
Federation of Danish Workers (3F). BJMF has a great deal of autonomy vis-a-vis 3F and even has its own 
special collective agreement regarding concrete construction work. Since most of the construction on the 
CMCR project is reinforced-concrete work such as casting the tunnels, stations and shafts, BJMF had a key 
role in organising and negotiating the conditions. Additionally, union organisers working on the CMCR were 
typically hired by BJMF with some financial support from the union federation. While BJMF is a strong and 
well-organised local section, it normally relies heavily on its many militant members to ensure the 
enforcement of collective agreements in the greater Copenhagen area. However, this strategy does not 
work well with non-unionised transnational workers, and BJMF has had to adopt new strategies for the 
highly transnationalised CMCR project. 
 
Data and methods 
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In line with the theoretical emphasis on how unions´ learn to mobilise resources and power to handle new 
challenges, the case study analysis is processual. The article draws on several data sources to reconstruct 
the transformation process, and the different data sources were triangulated to ensure the validity of the 
findings.  
First, a systematic search and review of news articles on labour-related events on the CMCR (2011-
2016) was used to reconstruct the main features of the process. Since the initial search yielded more than 
60,000 articles, most without relation to labour issues, the focus was narrowed to three outlets that mainly 
focused on the labour aspects of the CMCR project. Fagbladet, a union journal providing detailed, but 
obviously union-biased, coverage of labour-related issues; Licitation, a construction-sector-focused 
newspaper also providing detailed information on CMCR events, but with less emphasis on union action; 
and Politiken, one of the three largest national Danish newspapers provided information on national media 
coverage of the CMCR. The updated search provided 1,031 articles, all of which were read and summarised 
if they had relevance for labour relations. Then different events were ordered chronologically and 
categorised into broader categories such as ‘organising’, ‘enforcement’, ‘companies’, and so forth, which 
facilitated the analyses of these processes (for a condensed overview, see appendix 1). 
Second, we conducted semi-structured face-to-face interviews with union officials, union organisers, 
employer association representatives, labour inspectors, representatives from the Metro Company, and 
management in different companies on the CMCR. In total, 18 interviews with 22 interviewees were 
conducted which is almost a complete sample of the key institutional actors involved in the transformation 
process under study (Appendix 2 supplies a list of the interviews). The interviews aimed to 1) test and verify 
our understanding of the processes, 2) supplement our overview with events that flew under the media 
radar (like most everyday organising), and 3) improve our understanding of individual events, how the 
events were linked, and how the actors perceived them. Interviews were transcribed and thematically 
coded using qualitative data analysis software (Nvivo).  
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Finally, 3F had an evaluation report made on the CMCR-organising effort (Mathiassen, 2016), which 
contained otherwise inaccessible data on unionisation rates and provided valuable information on the 
union’s engagement with transnational workers and foreign firms on the CMCR. It also included 35 
interviews with and a large survey among the transnational CMCR workers, thus compensating somewhat 
for a lack of attention to the workers’ perspective in the original research design. While commissioned by 
the union, the report had a critical perspective on the unions’ effort, and we further interviewed the author 
about the findings. News media coverage, the union’s evaluation, and the interview data were then 
triangulated to test for consistency and to inform the overall analysis. The analysis below hence draws on 
this mixture of data to reconstruct and identify the most important factors in the transformation process.  
While this analytical approach has provided deep insights into the transformation process, there are 
some important limitations to our data. First, while several companies were interviewed and verified the 
improved working relations, companies terminated from the CMCR did not want to be interviewed. 
Therefore, our account of the actions of these companies is based on media coverage and interviewees 
from unions, the main contractor, and the developer. Second, because the original research design 
emphasised union strategies for institutional enactment, no interviews were conducted with transnational 
workers (except for one Italian worker who became a union organiser). As the analysis progressed, it 
became apparent that disregarding the centrality of the transnational workers’ perception of the process 
was problematic. Conducting interviews with transnational workers – particularly the elected shop 
stewards – would have allowed us to get a deeper understanding of the on-the-ground organising and 
mobilising process. However, almost none of the transnational workers who had been involved in the 
transformation process since the start-up phase of the project were still working on the CMCR at the time 
of the final interviews in 2017. Either their companies had finished on the project, or there had been 
workforce rotation within the company. Limited research resources restricted the possibilities of contacting 
these workers in their home country. Although the union evaluation (Mathiassen, 2016) did provide 
valuable insights on workers’ perceptions, this important omission implies that this study can mainly inform 
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us about trade union strategies and not about transnational workers´ tactics or perceptions of trade union 
actions (for an excellent analysis of transnational workers´ on-the-ground tactics, see Berntsen 2016). Still, 
trade union interviewees—consisting of both BJMF leadership and on-the-ground organisers – are in a 
good position for observing the aggregate effect of the changes to the CMCR´s organisation. The fact that 
they openly recognised the shortcomings of their strategies especially granted validity to the interview 
data.  
 
A ‘vicious’ circle of disorganisation and disruption  
While the CMCR became relatively well-organised, it started out as a union-hostile project. When the main 
contractor, CMT, arrived in Copenhagen in 2011, it barred BJMF from the CMCR construction sites. While 
Danish unions do not have a de jure access to construction sites, they normally have a de facto access, and 
rejection of access to construction sites is seen as hostility towards unions. Furthermore, transnational 
workers told union organisers that talking to union representatives could get them fired from the CMCR. As 
one transnational worker explained  ‘…everyone knew, that if [the company] knew I was in 3F, I would get 
fired.’ (Portuguese worker, quoted in Mathiassen, 2016:42). Additionally, CMT hired several foreign 
subcontractors known for previous violations of collective agreements and workers’ rights. In sum, while 
social clauses bound all CMCR companies by collective agreements, CMT´s approach indicated hostility 
towards unions and an exit-oriented strategy vis-à-vis Danish institutions.  
Bound by industrial peace, barred from the construction sites, and without members among the 
transnational workers, BJMF was unable to use the institutional power granted by the collective agreement 
because the union could not document any violations. Instead, BJMF used more symbolic forms of power 
such as media attention to gain leverage, and the bad publicity forced CMT to dismiss companies suspected 
of violations from the project. Still, the CMCR was caught in a vicious circle of disorganisation and 
disruption. Many companies circumvented the collective agreements because they did not fear sanctions. 
When fraud was exposed, the companies were dismissed, which caused disruptions in the construction 
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schedule. Meanwhile, unions had a hard time using this as leverage for improving the general conditions 
since the transnational workers were either fired or transferred to other companies rather than being 
compensated for the violations. Due to the lack of a common objective, there was a persisting disincentive 
for transnational workers to come forward and bear witness against employers, and the unions did not get 
many new members despite their continuous organising efforts. Therefore, despite having institutional and 
associational power at their disposal, BJMF was unable to use them successfully, and labour relations on 
CMCR were caught in a vicious circle from 2011 to early 2015. 
 
Explaining the shift 
During 2015, however, a significant shift occurred, and the following section analyses the three key changes 
that the unions enacted to create this shift. These are 1) long-term union organising efforts, which 
gradually became more strategic and inclusive as the result of a learning process; 2) mobilisation of political 
attention regarding the CMCR, causing an increasing engagement of the Metro Company in collective 
labour rights enforcement; and 3) a shift in the unions’ enforcement strategy from targeting all violations to 
building one strong case to display their power for workers and companies alike. In the following, these 
three processes of change are analysed individually, and then it is outlined how the interaction between 
them caused a major shift. 
 
From organising for enforcement to organising for workers and enforcement 
Having a strong membership base is vital for unions´ associational power, but also their structural power. 
BJMF knew that organising the transnational workers would be challenging and, therefore, started an 
organising effort early on. A CMCR-specific organiser was hired in 2009 (before CMT had even arrived) and 
another was hired, as the project got under way. However, three challenges obstructed the organising 
efforts. First, because Danish unions have wide-ranging possibilities for enforcing their collective 
agreements, some local union sections are more concerned with enforcement than organising when it 
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comes to transnational workers (Eldring et al., 2012). While the two newly hired organisers tried to break 
away from this enforcement-oriented and somewhat exclusionary strategy, the dilemma between 
enforcement and more inclusive organising strategies constantly lingered in the background and could 
potentially hamper the possibilities for generating a common objective with the transnational workers. 
Second, the organising efforts were rather unfocused, as one organiser explained: 
 
‘We were fighting blindfolded, going this way and that, poking in every direction. (…) We 
basically tried to organise the whole CMCR at once, but didn´t have a clear strategy on 
whether to organise or enforce (…). We just took the opportunities that arose’ (Interviewee 5, 
union organiser)       
 
Third, while the union translated leaflets about the Danish labour market, the organising officers did not 
speak the major languages of the workforce (Italian, Polish, Romanian, and Portuguese). This severely 
limited their capacity to communicate with the migrant workers, to inform them about their rights, acquire 
knowledge about their concerns and hear about potential breaches of the collective agreements. 
Consequently, while BJMF drew on its associational power and invested resources in organising, the 
unfocused and rather enforcement-oriented approach yielded few real improvements. The fact that BJMF 
had only two foreign members out of approximately 230 workers in early 2013 illustrates this well 
(Mathiassen, 2016).  
However, in 2014, the organising strategy started to change when the two organisers participated 
in a course about a UK-inspired ‘organising model’ (Arnholtz et al., 2014). This gave them an opportunity to 
reflect on previous errors and made them rethink their strategy. First, BJMF concentrated their tactic 
targeting one firm at a time and starting with a highly specialised company where resistance toward 
unionism was likely to be less pronounced. The idea was to increase union legitimacy on the CMCR and 
then allow unionisation to spread gradually to other companies. Second, organising efforts became more 
inclusive. Besides hiring organisers with the same cultural backgrounds as the transnational workers and 
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thereby addressing the importance of cultural and linguistic differences, BJMF also started addressing the 
transnational workers’ concerns about matters unrelated to collective agreements and industrial relations. 
As explained by one worker, labour rights were only one of the transnational workers’ concerns:  
 
’We were completely unfamiliar with the Danish system. How to find an apartment? What is the 
price? … We did not have time to find information on our rights.’ (Romanian worker, quoted in 
Mathiassen, 2016:58). 
 
To establish a common objectives with these workers, BJMF had to widen their focus: 
  
‘Taxation, health insurance, residents permit (…). We started helping them with things Danes would 
take care of this themselves. It was an unusually high level of service we provided and it was very costly 
in time and resources, but it was really important for turning things around’ (Interviewee 5, union 
organiser) 
 
Third, BJMF launched introductory courses about the Danish labour market for CMCR workers. These 
courses promoted organising in two important ways. First, the courses made some of the transnational 
workers ‘fall in love with the Danish model’ (Interviewee 10, union organiser) because they understood 
how it gave them influence. Second, workers from different nationalities and companies started talking 
about common problems during the course and, thus, started creating a common identity as metro 
workers. Since only a limited number of workers could participate, the union targeted ‘first-movers’ and in-
group leaders who often went back to their colleagues with a stronger sense of their rights and how to 
defend them.  
 
‘The first part of the courses was very basic and practical: How does the Danish system work, how to 
register your address so you can pay tax and go to the doctor, all of this. The second part was a bit 
more on collective agreements and local negotiations, tactics and such. And we have seen that after 
these courses, some of the companies have been pulled to the negotiation table and have had to 
increase the wages. That is very satisfying for us’. (Interviewee 5, union organiser). 
 
The more inclusive strategy led to gradual improvements in the unionisation, as BJMF organised 200 out of 
the 1.200 transnational CMCR workers by the end of 2014 (Mathiassen, 2016). 
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Politicising owner engagement with employment relations  
The second important factor in facilitating the shift was the growing involvement of the publicly-owned 
Metro Company in employment relations issues. Scholars have shown the importance of public 
procurement in the regulation of employment relations (Jaehrling et al., 2018a), and the CMCR case 
illustrates how public owners can promote a move towards a virtuous circle by influencing employers’ 
orientation as described by Doellgast et al. (2018). Nevertheless, it also shows that union action can be vital 
for mobilising the public clients’ involvement. 
As the CMCR tenders required all contractors and subcontractors to abide by collective agreements, 
the Metro Company expected this to secure decent conditions and hoped to resolve problems via informal 
dialogue (Interviewee 3, Metro Company Director). However, the initial lack of trust between CMT and 
BJMF meant the informal dialogue never got under way. Instead, BJMF used media attention to put 
pressure on the Metro Company. From 2011 to 2013, BJMF organisers frequently appeared in national 
media reports about health and safety violations or the lack of apprentices on CMCR. As such, the project 
was already publicly politicised when Fagbladet started reporting about collective agreement violations in 
June 2012 (Fagbladet, 12-06-2012). In the subsequent news coverage, BJMF succeeded in portraying CMCR 
companies as crooks, the Metro Company as too passive, and themselves as the sole defenders of workers 
rights. As more stories emerged and spread to national media, political pressure on the Metro Company 
increased. From initially targeting the individual firms, BJMF representatives started increasingly to 
condemn the Metro Company for not securing decent working conditions on this tax-financed project. Both 
the mayor of Copenhagen and the minister of transport got involved, and the Metro Company had to react. 
From initially having defended CMCR companies against BJMF´s accusations, the Metro Company´s reaction 
was to force CMT to terminate the companies in question but without taking any general action to improve 
employment relations. However, BJMF continued to promote media attention on new issues, and during 
the summer of 2014, the Social Democratic mayor of Copenhagen came under significant pressure from his 
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constituency regarding the problems at CMCR. Subsequently, a clear message was sent to the Metro 
Company that things needed to change, and from mid-2014, the Metro Company became much more 
active regarding employment relations.  
First, it forced CMT to replace its managing director and HR manager, both of whom had been in 
constant conflict with BJMF. The new director had a more positive approach to the unions, and the new HR 
manager was a former Danish unionist who regarded unions as partners rather than adversaries. Second, 
the Metro Company initiated an investigation of wages and employment conditions on the CMCR, which 
revealed collective agreement violations in almost every investigated company and a total lack of 
knowledge about labour rights among workers. In response, the Metro Company started distributing 
pamphlets about workers’ rights in most of the relevant languages. Third, the Metro Company hired a new 
vice-director with focus on employment relations. She immediately started informal talks with BJMF to re-
establish trust. Unions were not only granted access to construction sites; the Metro Company provided 
them with on-site offices and information boards to show the transnational workers that unions were 
legitimate actors on the CMCR. Furthermore, the new director increased the Metro Company´s effort to 
enforce collective agreements on the CMCR, thereby forcing more companies to adopt a less exit-oriented 
strategy. 
In sum, the involvement of the Metro Company changed from being a rather passive bystander to 
becoming actively engaged in promoting and enforcing worker rights during 2014. Some observers have 
argued that the need for the Metro Company´s assistance illustrates the diminishing associational and 
structural power of Danish unions, who would normally both impose and enforce collective agreements 
without the assistance of public authorities or developers. While this is to some extent true, it was the 
unions’ successful use of symbolic power, which forced the Metro Company to become a more socially 
responsible customer.  
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Strategic enforcement in the Cipa case 
The final important factor in explaining the major shift is a change in the union’s enforcement strategy. 
With all CMCR companies covered by collective agreements, BJMF had obtained significant institutional 
power. However, the effective use of this power was dependent on the enforcement of collective 
agreements. Initially, BJMF aimed at addressing every collective agreement violation they detected on the 
CMCR. However, with unions barred from the construction sites, having virtually no members on the 
project, and facing transnational workers with a low incentive to engage with them, systematic 
enforcement on this huge and fragmented construction project was practically impossible. As with the 
organising efforts, the effort went in all directions without much result.  
In late 2013, a newly elected BJMF leadership introduced a new and more strategic approach to 
enforcement on the CMCR. Rather than trying to address every violation, they targeted only a few major 
companies. This was not an easy decision because many union members and officials saw it as abandoning 
an important principle.  
‘Before the EU-enlargement we had the understanding that we controlled this sector, but 
then the boat started leaking (…). Realising that we didn´t have the resources to control 
everything was very painful and gave a feeling of powerlessness … it had been part of our 
self-perception that we could control everything. But we had to change strategy. So now we 
aim for making a difference where we can. Previously we had way too many cases and none 
of them got solved properly … We did not get any money, any new members or anything’ 
(Interviewee 11, union management BJMF)  
 
Based on this new approach, a solid legal case was built against Italian company Cipa during 2014. BJMF 
build the case on testimonies from workers of different nationalities, but Cipa tried to hinder the 
proceeding by firing workers who came forward and by telling other workers that they had bought off 
BJMF. Nonetheless, the trust built up by previous organising efforts was starting to pay off, and the new 
enforcement strategy proved successful when Italian, Romanian, and Polish workers gave witness on behalf 
of BJMF. The Labour Court verdict of March 2015 fined Cipa approximately €3 million for violating the 
collective agreement—the largest fine in the history of the Danish Labour Court. In other words, the 
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associational power mobilised by BJMF´s organising efforts proved vital for the effective use of 
institutionalised power gained from collective agreements.  
 
Linking organising, politicisation, and enforcement 
While each of these three processes of change was important, the way the union managed to connect 
them was the real cause of the shift in the organisation of the CMCR. The Cipa ruling became an important 
turning point because BJMF used it to tie organising efforts, symbolic pressure on the Metro Company, and 
their enforcement strategy together. First, BJMF demanded from CMT and the Metro Company that Cipa 
should ‘stay and pay’ the fine (Interviewee 11, union management BJMF). In previous cases, the offending 
companies had declared bankruptcy or left Denmark when fined, which made it practically impossible for 
the union to collect the money. Linking the ruling to the Metro Company´s increasing interest in avoiding 
bad publicity, BJMF argued that if the Metro Company and CMT wanted to re-establish trustful relations, 
making Cipa pay would be paramount. If not, BJMF would have the right to blockade the construction sites 
due to unpaid wages, and they threatened to use this structural power at a very time-sensitive phase in the 
construction process when concrete was to be delivered. Seeking to avoid the blockade and to re-establish 
good working relations with BJMF, both the Metro Company and CMT entered intense negotiations with 
Cipa and forced the company to stay and pay. For the first time, BJMF got a significant sum of money for 
collective agreement violations, and they established a working relationship with the new management of 
CMT in the process (Interviewee 11, union management BJMF; Interviewee 13, CMT Chief Operating 
Officer). 
Second, BJMF distributed the money among the transnational workers. BJMF-members at Cipa were 
automatically entitled to their part of the payment, but since the union – and not the workers - is the legal 
partner in the collective agreements in the Danish IR-system, BJMF could have kept the fines concerning 
unorganised Cipa workers. However, after long internal debates, BJMF decided to distribute the money to 
the unorganised Cipa workers, if they would join the union. 
19 
 
 
‘We had a long debate in BJMF about what to do. We had spent a lot of resources and could really use 
the money, and it was also against fundamental principles paying them when they join [only] 
afterwards. But we argued that perhaps it would be better to open up and show the workers that we 
are not the mafia their employers said we are, but that we are as we say we are. Luckily, we convinced 
the BJMF board that this was what we should do’ (Interviewee 6, BJMF organiser)   
 
Since the decision to distribute the fine to non-members meant that joining the union implied a cash 
payment, BJMF unsurprisingly saw a significant increase in membership among Cipa workers (from 26 
members at the start of 2015 to 147 by the end of 2015). Meanwhile, overall union density on CMCR also 
rose during this period from 16 per cent to 31 per cent (Mathiassen, 2016). This indicates that the 
organising efforts, the Cipa ruling, and the distribution of the Cipa money had shown an increasing number 
of the transnational workers that the Danish unions share the same objectives and, hence, were worth 
joining.  
Third, the Cipa case showed other companies that BJMF had the associational and structural power 
(supported by the Metro Company) to enforce their institutional power and, therefore, should be taken 
seriously—both as an adversary and as a partner. In the month following the Cipa verdict, two other 
companies agreed to settlements for violations of the collective agreements. Furthermore, this initiated 
negotiations between BJMF and CMT regarding a new local agreement that would grant companies the 
working time flexibility they needed in exchange for an hourly wage increase of 1.3 euro for all workers, 
additional overtime compensation, and improved conditions for shop stewards. During the negotiations, 
the Metro Company, CMT and BJMF established a good working relationship, and when new collective 
agreement violations were discovered, BJMF would publicly acknowledge the efforts of CMT in sorting 
things out. 
In sum, the interaction between the three processes of change facilitated the creation of a self-
sustaining virtuous circle, which was furthered by the improved conditions granted by the new local 
agreement that led to a massive increase in the number of shop stewards among the transnational 
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workers. This contributes to the increasing regulation of CMCR by continuously re-establishing the union’s 
relations with workers and companies while helping secure the everyday enforcement of collective 
agreements. Meanwhile, foreign companies have become more concerned about the risks of violating 
collective agreements and engaged in a continuous dialogue with BJMF or their shop stewards. 
Consequently, the overall construction process runs much smoother now, and both unions and companies 
seem content with the new situation. 
 
Discussion and conclusion  
Enactment of existing inclusive institutions has been very challenging on large-scale, transnationalised 
European construction projects, with employment relations often trapped in a vicious circle. Nevertheless, 
Danish construction unions have managed to move the employment relations on the CMCR construction 
project into a virtuous circle of enforcement, organisation, and cooperation, where the formal inclusive 
Danish institutions are enacted. The unions successfully organised transnational workers, with union 
membership density eventually reaching above 30 per cent among those workers. This should be compared 
to the 6-7 per cent membership rate generally found among transnational construction workers in 
Copenhagen (Arnholtz and Andersen, 2016) and indicates the success of BJMF´s strategies regarding the 
CMCR. 
Drawing on the theoretical framework of Doellgast et al. (2018), the study illustrates how the 
inclusiveness of existing formal institutions (mainly collective agreements), employers’ strategies, and a 
common objective among workers and unions were important for the shift in employment relations. 
Additionally, it highlights that owner involvement can be important for the enactment of institutions. In 
other words, organising a workplace takes more than organising workers, and the success of union 
strategies are dependent on other factors. Focusing on what unions can do, this study shows that unions’ 
strategic use of power and resources influences the alignment of these factors. While unions’ institutional 
embeddedness is highly important for this process, other power resources are also paramount because 
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they allow unions to use the institutional power of the collective agreements in a strategic manner and to 
organise the transnational workers. As such, the case study shows how the Danish unions also utilised 
symbolic and associational power to mobilise political pressure and structural and associational power to 
make the realistic threat of a large-scale blockade of the project at a vulnerable time in the construction to 
enact the formal institutions.  
Still, faced with radically new situations, unions must learn how to use their resources in 
innovative ways (Lévesque and Murray, 2010). Danish unions changed their strategies in three regards:  
developing new and more inclusive organising strategies to strengthen the sense of common objectives, 
politicising the public owner’s responsibility for employment relations issues, and opting for a more 
selective enforcement of collective agreement violations. First, the union applied substantial associational 
resources to develop more inclusive organising strategies by emphasising the transnational workers’ needs 
rather than the union’s wish for enforcing the collective agreement. This helped to build a certain trust 
between the transnational workers and the union organisers. Sharing the penance pay in the Cipa-case 
with the transnational workers, who joined the union only after the case, helped further the trust in the 
unions as being on the transnational workers’ side. However, taking this inclusive approach required 
debates about the purpose of organising within the union (Simms and Holgate, 2010). Second, unable to 
solve problems through informal dialogue and institutional channels, the union had to reinvent its use of 
symbolic power to politicise the public owner´s responsibility for the employment relation—an issue only 
lightly touched upon in previous studies. Third, the union opted for selective enforcement rather than their 
traditional approach of enforcing all violations. By mobilising the transnational workers for the Labour 
Court cases, the strategic enforcement combined with the inclusive organising effort moved the Danish 
unions further away from their previous more exclusive enforcement strategy in which the transnational 
workers were often not included (Eldring et al., 2012).  
While these strategic changes improved the inclusion of the transnational workers, it is less 
clear a whether a common purpose has emerged given the limitations of our data. There is a contradiction 
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between BJMF’s attempt to become an organising union and the fact that inclusiveness was promoted by 
an unusually high level of service for transnational workers. Additionally, Mathiesen (2016) draw on 
interviews with CMCR workers to argue that occasionally they feel insufficiently involved in local 
bargaining, while our union interviewees report that some CMCR workers are disgruntled because BJMF 
does not take enough care of local problems. Hence, both unions and workers seem to want more worker-
led engagement, but both also seem to acknowledge that union-led action is most effective. Future studies 
on transnational organisation should include migrant workers in the data collection to strengthen our 
knowledge on their perspective on these issues, but the sparse data here suggests that organising 
transnational workers must involve debates about the political purpose of organising within unions and 
with the transnational workers (Simms and Holgate, 2010). 
Furthermore, the emphasis on unions’ strategic action and learning does not imply that 
union action alone explains the transformation. The pre-existence of inclusive institutions and the enduring 
power resources of the Danish construction union were preconditions for the success and indicating that 
less powerful unions in more liberal market economies will face very different challenges. Furthermore, the 
relatively long duration of the project provided unions time to develop their strategies and build a trustful 
relationship with the transnational workers, something that is more challenging in shorter projects. Still, 
the CMCR case shares many characteristics with the previously studied large, transnational construction 
projects in regulated economies where unions were less successful (Berntsen and Lillie, 2016; Wagner and 
Lillie, 2014; Lillie and Sippola, 2011). Therefore, the Danish unions’ experience of achieving a virtuous circle 
of enactment by combining inclusive organising strategies, the politicisation of public owner engagement, 
and the strategic application of power resources in relation to enforcement may be a model that can 
inspire unions in other regulated economies with formally inclusive institutions.  
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